Introduction

3
This paper offers a descriptive overview of the way in which New South Wales water law has developed and in so doing briefly considers Roman law, the common law of England, the common law of Australia and various statutory regimes for the public management of water. The paper also raises the issue of water regulation and management by reference to Garret Hardin's work, on the need to regulate a commons. 4 In tracing the legal history of water management, special emphasis is placed on the nature of the rights created in, and in relation to, water. The nature of rights is significant because legal classifications determine how the object must be dealt with in terms of trade, succession,
Transforming Cultures eJournal Vol. 1 No. 2 © 2006 Janice Gray voluntary assignments (e.g. gifts), bankruptcy and compulsory acquisition, for example. To explain, the requirements for passing title in a chair, from A to B, (which is what a sale involves) depend on how a chair is legally classified. In being classified as personal property the sale of a chair will involve very different processes and regimes compared with say, the sale of a house, which is classified as real property.
5 Non-compliance with these regimes will lead to a failure to pass title successfully in the interest and that, in turn, could lead to many unintended outcomes.
For example, if property has not been transferred properly, from A to B, either at law or in equity, 6 it may be the case that taxation liability will continue to accrue in the hands of the vendor. Such unintended (as well as other intended) outcomes are potentially relevant to water if it is to be traded.
Further the sphere of enforceability of the right is linked to legal categorisation. Accordingly, if a right is enforceable against third parties it is likely to be classified as property and if it is classified as property it is generally enforceable against third parties. 7 If one holds property rights in goods, interference with those property rights may ground actions in the torts of trespass, detinue and conversion. Without a property interest in the first place these torts are unavailable.
To take another example, where property (rather than some other type of interest) is compulsorily acquired by the Crown, the Commonwealth Constitution makes provision for compensation on just terms. Further, whether an interest in, or related to, property is sub-classified as (a) a legal interest (b) an equitable interest or (c) a mere equity, will have implications for how priority 5 Statute often overlays/modifies common law regimes on the issues of transfer and alienability. 6 Equity is a parallel jurisdiction to the common law. Its original justification was that it tempered the rigours of the common law. Equity began with the King (and later the Chancellor) meting out individualised and contextualised justice. 7 The issue is somewhat circular but in the legal, as opposed to moral sense, this much is clear; the flip side of right is a remedy and hence a right exists where a remedy is available. In regard to the sub-category of rights known as property rights, lawyers, philosophers, political theorists and economists continue to debate both their meaning and how best to define them. Milirrpum v Nabalco (1971) 17 FLR 141 offers some guidance by setting out some of the indicia of property which include: the right to exclude all others; the right to alienate and the right to use and enjoy. Without a right to exclude no-one has dominion. Without dominion there is no property. K. Gray, "Property in Thin Air" (1991) CLJ 252 refers to property as a 'bundle of rights' and K. Gray & S. Gray (1998) "The Idea of Property in Law", in Bright & Dewar (eds.) , Land Law: Themes and Perspectives, Oxford University Press, p. 15 comment that property is "not a thing but rather a relationship which one has with a thing… 'Property' is…rather the word one uses to describe particular concentrations of power over things and resources." Chief Justice Gleeson and Gaudron, Kirby & Hayne J.J commented in Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351 that "'property' does not refer to a thing: it is a description of a legal relationship with a thing. It refers to a degree of power that is recognised in law as power permissibly exercised over the thing." See also Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 349 and R v Toohey; ex parte Meneling Station PtyLtd (1982) 158 CLR 327.
Transforming Cultures eJournal Vol. 1 No. 2 © 2006 Janice Gray disputes between competing interests are resolved. 8 Therefore, it can be seen that legal classifications may be significant, amongst other things, in the determination of remedies and in order to comply with the appropriate regimes for the transfer of rights.
In the context of trade it is also important to know (in a legal sense) what one is buying or selling.
That knowledge will have an impact on the price a seller will ask and a buyer will pay because it will determine what can be done with the right or entitlement. 9 Hence legal classifications, whether they be creatures of the common law or statute, are among the conditions of any emerging market in water and as such require specification and analysis.
Having first established why legal classifications (a) generally and (b) more particularly in the context of a (partial) water market have relevance, 10 the paper then takes a more reflexive turn. It moves to focus on one of the fundamental issues, that of whether or not water is best managed by market forces. The commodification of water entitlements and the establishment of a water economy have won favour with policy and law makers. It is presently voguish and has been warmly embraced. The rationale behind the shift is the encouragement of water use from low economic use purposes to high economic use purposes. Put simply, water will be used for purposes that yield better returns. Further, if water is more expensive to buy, the view is that it will be treated more reverently. The resource will become valued. But it is not clear that commodifying water entitlements and leaving the market to give them "value" is necessarily the best way to deal with the management of a resource about which there is a "common" or shared concern. The paper concludes by raising some questions about the trend to commodification and the implementation of water trading.
Background
Water, along with air, is one of the most valuable natural resources that the world has available to it. Yet, historically, in Australia, water has been used as though it were not a limited resource. It 8 NB Statutory variations may alter the common law priority rules.
9 Economic classifications of property are discussed in D.E. Fisher (2004) In short, many people including environmentalists, irrigators, scientists, academics, lawyers, farmers, economists, Indigenous groups and political scientists have contributed to the dawning realisation that water availability is finite and our approach to its use and management needs rethinking. 22 Although reform packages need to incorporate a range of approaches including legal changes, policy development, scientific research and education programs, the focus of this paper is largely legal with some regard being given to policy issues.
In this context, it is useful to begin by considering how water has been legally classified and in that regard the Roman law classifications will be considered first. 
Roman Law -water as common property
According to Roman law, not all rights were conceived of as private. 23 Res nullius belonged to nobody. Res publicae belonged to the state and res communes belonged to everyone. Justinian notably classified the air, running water, the sea and the sea-shores as res communes. Rights over these objects were collectively referred to as ius naturale.
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One of the key grounds on which a resource could be classified as res communes was that the substance in question was both plentiful and pure. 25 As running water was seemingly in abundance it made sense to characterise it in a way that allowed it to belong to everyone. All could use it freely and (so it was thought at the time) without fear of the resource running out.
Water in flow was, therefore, seemingly unregulated under the Roman system of law and was categorised as common property.
According to Fisher, prior to the feudal system, Anglo-Saxon law "disclosed similar approaches" 26 i.e. in Britain, water was largely unregulated and regarded as common property.
27
Yet, the common property approach appeared to lose impetus in England and ultimately the common law, (originally grounded in feudalism) prevailed.
Under the common law system, the Roman oriented approach of res communes gave way to 'rights of common '. 28 According to Holdsworth, rights of common (which were exercisable by commoners) included the right to take fish from someone else's water and the right to take timber 23 That is the case in common law jurisdictions too. Fisher (2000:65) . 26 Fisher (2004:203-204 Fisher (2004:204) . 28 Note that in 1066 when William, the Conqueror, came to Great Britain he claimed almost all the lands for himself and set up a system of feudal tenures which allowed individuals to hold interests in land 'of' the Crown. Indeed the process of subinfeudation, by which more rungs were added to the tenurial pyramid may be seen as an acknowledgement of private and individual tenures (cf. common property) albeit tenures which involved substantial obligations in return. At advising this cause much darkness was occasioned by a notion which some of the judges unwarily adopted, as if a river could be appropriated like a field or a 29 Holdsworth (1936:143-144) as cited in Fisher (2004:204) . 30 A profit a prendre is a proprietary right and it allows one or more parties to take resources from the land or water of another. It is distinguished from a licence in that it is a property right while a licence is a personal right, amounting to a permission. 31 For a discussion of this point see Fisher (2004:204) . 32 To some extent easements were also relevant to water access rights. A river, which is in perpetual motion, is not naturally susceptible of appropriation; and were it susceptible, it would be greatly against the public interest that it should be suffered to be brought under private property. In general by the laws of all polished nations, appropriation is authorised with respect to every subject that is best enjoyed separately; but barred with respect to every subject that is best enjoyed in common …Water drawn from a river into vessels or into ponds becomes private property; but to admit of such property with respect to the river itself, considered as a complex body, would be inconsistent with the public interest, by putting in the power of one man to lay waste to a whole country… A river may be considered as the common property of the whole nation [my emphasis]; but the law declares against separated property of the whole or part…A river is a subject composed of a trunk and branches. No individual can appropriate a river, or any branch of it; but every individual of the nation, those especially who have land adjoining, are entitled to use the water for their private purposes. …
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Under this conception of common property everyone, including both riparian owners and others, could use river water in flow. As Lord Kames expressed it these rights resembled more of Justinian's res communes rather than his res publicae. 
Common law: Water in flow belongs to no-one Terminology
Before embarking on a discussion of how the common law of England characterised water it is perhaps useful to clarify some terminology. The term 'common law' has several meanings including (a) 'judge-made' law; (b) law administered by courts exercising their legal rather than equitable jurisdiction and; (c) law based on the English system of justice rather than the civil system as exemplified by Roman law (and still underpinning much European law). The particular meaning more often than not needs to be adduced from the context in which the term is used.
Clearly all the meanings listed above are different from the phrase 'the commons' and should not 37 Embrey v Owen (1851) 
Relationship of English common law to Australian law
Australia inherited much common law from England but how relevant that law was to Australian conditions and circumstances is debatable. English common law evolved in a culturally and geographically different place, several oceans way. While it may have been apt for a rainy climate, where rivers were clearly delineated water courses with deep banks, it was not necessarily apt for the driest continent in the world where rivers were often no more than shallow, red, dirt channels that gushed with muddy torrents a couple of times per year. Nevertheless, English common law formed the basis of Australian water law because when a 'settled' colony (as New South Wales was legally characterised) became part of the Crown's dominion, the law of England became the law of the colony. 39 It is now well rehearsed that the reception of English law into Australia by this method was only ever meant to apply to law that was appropriate to the circumstances of the new land but that gloss was not widely applied and the common law of England, including its water law, became the basis of Australian law irrespective of its poor fit.
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Indeed Justice Windeyer stated in 1962 that "it is beyond doubt that these rules [English common
law rules] are a part, and an important part of the common law that Australia inherited." 41 Further it was noted in 1900 that the application of English law (with respect to riparian rights) to
Australian conditions was a 'source of insuperable difficulty'.
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As discussed later under the heading "Further Limitations on Access to Water", that inherited/received common law of England, particularly as it related to water, was modified by 
How the common law characterised water in flow
Unlike the law of Scotland, the common law of England (at least according to Embrey v Owen) found that water in flow was not the subject of property. 44 The idea that something was not susceptible to a characterisation as property was not unfamiliar to English law. Other things had also escaped the proprietary classification. For example, at common law there was no property in a wild animal. 45 It was only when the captor of the animal was able to demonstrate 'possession' of it that he or she could protect his or her right in the animal against the rest of the world. Put another way, it was only then that the captor had a proprietary right. Cases such as these often turned on the question of what acts demonstrated 'possession'. Accordingly, a fish was said to be 'possessed' only when it was enclosed in a net but not before. 46 A whale was 'occupied' by its hunters at the point it was harpooned. It remained occupied even if the harpoon fell out, so long as the rope from the harpoon restricted the whale's movements enough to cause easy recapture.
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An oyster could even be taken from the water without fear of the allegation of theft because it was a wild animal (ferae naturae) and not subject to ownership. 48 In more recent times other things have been found not be the subject of property. For example, there is no property in a spectacle 49 or a stem cell line.
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In keeping with these cases, it would seem that the reason water in flow was found not to be the subject of property was that one of the key legal aspects of ownership, that is possession, for the maintenance of life and unlike food it did not need to be tended, harvested or hunted. It was simply there. Such an approach would have been in keeping with the view that water was a gift from 'God' to all his/her creatures and should, therefore, be shared by them rather than appropriated privately. 53 It followed from this that there is no property interest, at common law, in the water of a free flowing river.
Common law-access to water in flow
Riparian rights
The situation appeared to be different when the subject of discussion was access to water rather than water in flow itself, according to Parke B in Embrey v Owen. 54 While water itself was not the subject of property, access to water was regarded as possible by virtue of one's ownership of the land through or over which the water flowed. The water to which these landholders had access, although described as a publici juris (a public right), was a term which in Parke B's lexicon appeared to represent something of a hybridisation, involving Justinian's concepts of res communes (belonging to everyone) and res publicae (belonging to the state). 55 Further, Parke B's 51 The legal concept of possession has been expressed as the ability to demonstrate sufficient physical control to ground an action in trespass. The right to have the stream to flow in its natural state without diminution and alteration is an incident to the property in the land through which it passes: but flowing water is publici juris, not in the sense of a bonum vacans, 57 to which the first occupant may acquire an exclusive right, but that it is public and common [my emphasis] in this sense only, that all may reasonably use it who have a right of access [my emphasis] to it, that none have any property in the water itself, except in the particular portion which he may take into his possession, and that during the time of his possession only. But each proprietor of the adjacent land has the right to the usufruct of the stream which flows through it.
This right to the benefit and advantage of the water flowing past his land, is not an absolute and exclusive right to the flow of the water in its natural state; if it were, the argument of the learned counsel, that every abstraction of it would give a cause of action, would be irrefragable; but it is a right only to the flow of the water, and the enjoyment of it, subject to the similar rights of all the proprietors of the banks on each side to the reasonable enjoyment of the same gift of Providence. It is only therefore for an unreasonable and unauthorised use of this common benefit that the action will lie; 58 Like Parke B, Starkie on Evidence 59 also referred to flowing water as 'publici juris' but he also understood only riparian owners to have the right to usufruct (access) it. He said that:
The water in a running stream is publici juris, which each successive proprietor has a right to use in passing, but which is the property of no-one; but if one of such owners appropriates the water by applying it to a particular purpose, he has a right to do so, provided he does not thereby prejudice any other owner in his previous use and appropriation of the water to other purposes.
60
In turn the holders of riparian rights were restricted in their taking of water to the extent that they had to ensure that their use was not unreasonable, nor unauthorised. As has been suggested, the nineteenth century English cases responsible for developing the law in relation to water indicate that water in flow was neither the subject of private nor public ownership. Accordingly, water in flow was not really common property nor an individual's private property. Later, as we will discover, legislation vested rights "to the use and flow and control of the water in all rivers" in the Crown but the ambit and nature of the Crown's rights proved to be contestable. 66 What has not been in dispute, however, is that water is a resource about which there is common concern. As a result, much of what Garrett Hardin, in his article, 'The Tragedy of the Commons', stated in relation to the preservation of a resource that all people need to use, remains relevant.
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A central point of Hardin's thesis was that "[f]reedom in a commons brings ruin to all". Here the term 'commons' appears to be more grounded in economic understandings rather than legal ones and accordingly it relates to the use and management of a resource that is held by a community of users rather than to the rights which support that use and management of the resource. To continue, put another way, Hardin's thesis is that resources on which we all depend as a community need to be regulated because we cannot rely on Adam Smith's belief that individuals will be "led by an invisible hand to promote the public interest". 68 Hardin saw a range of resources such as water, air, national parks and farming land as being degraded by the unregulated use of society. Hence he suggested that:
[we] have several options. We might sell them [commons] off as private property. We might keep them as public property, but allocate the right to enter them. The allocation might be on the basis of wealth, by the use of an auction system. It might be on the basis of merit, as defined by some agreed upon standards. It might be by lottery. Or it might be on first-come, first-served basis, administered to long queues. 
A need to regulate and issues of legal classification
At one level and on Hardin's reasoning, it is perhaps unnecessary to be overly concerned with how water is classified. Whether it be a commons, common property or something else may be thought to be immaterial. For example, in a scientific sense, the legal classification of water in flow or rights to access it may not be greatly significant. What may be more important is that access to and use of water is regulated, controlled and managed so that the resource is not destroyed. Further, there may well be a concern that this is achieved bearing in mind the importance of accommodating both environmental and human dependency on water.
However, in a legal sense it remains important to establish how water is classified (as discussed earlier) particularly if the trading of rights or entitlements in or in relation to water is to be used as a means of promoting the protection and better management of the resource itself; an outcome sought by Hardin and others. Buyers and sellers need to know exactly what it is they are buying and selling. As noted earlier there will be different legal regimes for the transfer of differently legally classified objects or things. 71 Classifications will also influence how one's legal right will impact on another. For example, the establishment of some legal rights will destroy native title whilst others will not. Hence a statutory lease, such as that discussed in the Wik case, will not 70 Ibid. Note that a similar debate presently exists about the commons of cyberspace.
71 At times the common law position will interact with a statutory one. For example, in the case of shares, transfers are to be affected according to the rules relating to choses in action transfers but also in accordance with the relevant statute which will usually have regard to the company's articles of association. 
Further limitations on access to water
Control through riparian rights
As noted above early attempts at the regulation of access to water were achieved by the introduction of the riparian rights doctrine. 75 That doctrine regulated the number of users by tying water access rights to ownership of land adjoining rivers. It further introduced restrictions on how water was to be used by denying the right to degrade the water quality or quantity of another potential user. 76 Hence the riparian rights doctrine was more restrictive than the Roman civil law approach which found that "a river may be considered the common property of the whole 76 Embrey v Owen (1851) 6 Exch 353 at 370 -371 per Parke B stated that the riparian owner "should use the water in a reasonable manner, and so as not to destroy, or render useless, or materially diminish or affect the application of the water proprietors above or below on the stream. He must not shut the gates of his dam and detain the water unreasonably, or let it off in unusual quantities, to the annoyance of his neighbours". For a more comprehensive discussion of the common law position in relation to surface water in flow see Fisher, (2001:64 
Statutory frameworks for the public management of water
The broad restrictions contained in the common law riparian rights doctrine were developed further by the introduction, in New South Wales, of comprehensive water legislation in 1896. 
Water Rights Act 1896 (NSW)
Significantly, this Act spelt out the types of water that vested in the Crown. It stated that:
The right to the use and flow and to the control of the water in all rivers and lakes which flow through or past or are situate within the land of two or more occupiers, and of the water contained in or conserved by any works to which this Act extends, shall, subject only to the restriction hereinafter vest in the Crown.
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The second part of the same provision went on to provide for water management by specifying the outcomes the Act was designed to achieve. It stated:
And in the exercise of that right the Crown, by its officers and servants, may enter any land and take such measures as may be thought fit or as may be prescribed for the conservation and supply of such water as aforesaid and its more equal distribution and beneficial use and its protection from pollution, and for preventing the unauthorised obstruction of rivers. 
Water Act 1912 (NSW)
Crown rights in water move to Ministerial Corporations
The Water Act 1912 (NSW) followed many of the principles in the 1896 Act. However, some important changes were brought about by the introduction, in 1986, of the Water Administration Ministerial Corporation rather than as had been the case, the Crown. 87 The Water Administration
Ministerial Corporation was given rights to take measures for specified purposes that included those contained in the 1896 legislation but went beyond them covering flood control and mitigation as well as environmental protection.
Basic Landholder Rights
Further, by the interaction of s 7 of the Water Act 1912 (NSW) and Schedule 2 of the Water Administration Act 1986 (NSW) the owner of land which formed the bank of a river or a lake was permitted to take and use water in the river or lake to:
(a) water stock;
(b) irrigate gardens not exceeding two hectares and associated with a dwelling house and;
(c) irrigate land not exceeding two hectares used for non-commercial purposes associated with a dwelling house.
88
The public management of water was, therefore, linked to the shift of rights in or associated with, water from the Crown, to a Corporation responsible for bringing about designated outcomes. This occurred along with the creation of statutory rights vested in riparian owners.
89
Entitlements to water still tied to rights in land
Although the twentieth century marked an era of prolific statutory growth in regard to water (a growth that often related to the provision of infrastructure and irrigation schemes) the public management regime was one which still made entitlements to water derivative of rights in land. Godden (2003) .
Transforming Cultures eJournal Vol. 1 No. 2 © 2006 Janice Gray the basis of the area of land that they had to service. (Four hundred acres was the usual area but there was no limit on the water used on the four hundred acres.)
Shift to volumetric entitlements
Later, in 1977, the licensing scheme under the 1912 Act altered from an area based one to a volumetric entitlement on 'regulated' streams (see Division 4B). The transition meant that licences on regulated streams were given six megalitres per hectare of allocation except for the Macquarie Valley where licences were given eight megalitres per hectare. There was no restriction on the area where the water was used within the land named in the licence. 91 The benefit of the licence enured for the benefit of the occupier and accordingly the benefit was deemed to transfer with the land when the land was sold or passed by another means (eg by voluntarily assignment or court order.) Under the 1912 Act the right to access water (i.e. to take water from a particular source) and the right to use water (i.e. to apply it to a purpose) were granted under the same licence. Although observers rightly claim that the 1912 regime overemphasised the principles of consumption rather than sustainability, 92 it can be noted that in the 1980s and 1990s some irrigators were persuaded to relinquish a percentage of their allocations to increase environmental flows.
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Trading under the Water Act 1912
Under the 1912 Act the trading of basic entitlements was introduced in 1986. That change marked a shift towards the commodification of water entitlements but the shift was not accompanied by the same vocal public discussion leading up to and since the introduction of the
Water Management Act 2000 (NSW)
. Sustainable use found translation in the idea of environmental flows while efficiency was, in part, pursued by reference to water allocation and the associated concept of commodification. The preexisting system of water allocation was regarded as imprecise and unsatisfactory. Investigation had revealed over-allocations of water (meaning that if everyone exercised their entitlement to take water, there would be insufficient water to go around). In the context of over-allocation and a degraded water environment, a view gained currency that the best way to address some of these problems was to separate out entitlements to water from rights in land and then to proceed with the establishment of a (partial) national water market. It should also be noted that National Competition Council payments (designed to encourage and reward the removal of barriers to competition) which were, in turn, tied to the satisfaction of Competition Policy, provided an impetus for water reform. Whereas earlier legislation, by investing the Crown and later Ministerial Corporations with the task of management, had sought to protect water as a community resource in which there was a common concern, the new legislation seeks to effectively manage water, at least in part, by relying on market forces. Water access is regulated according to market demands rather than at the hand of an over-arching government-based body. The legislation is premised on the view that the trading of entitlements to access water, will among other things, promote the efficient and equitable sharing of water from water sources and at the same give benefits to the environment, urban communities, fisheries, culture, heritage and Aboriginal people.
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How does the WMA facilitate the commodification of water?
The key provisions which facilitate the commodification of water are those that lead to the 'unbundling' of water entitlements from rights in land and those that establish a regime for transfers. By severing land rights from water, water entitlements are prima facie free to be transferred independently but further questions arise in terms of (a) the nature of the object being traded and (b) the statutory regime directing the manner in which those entitlements can be traded.
What can be traded?
The WMA permits the trading of access to water. The right to access is a perpetual entitlement and is contained in a Water Access Licence (WAL) under the Act. The provisions relating to WALs became operational in July, 2004. WALs, in turn, consist of two parts: (a) a share component and; (b) an extraction component both of which are tradeable under s 71Q.
Water Access Licences
The share component provides the holder of the right to a specified share in the available surface or sub-surface water within a specified management area or from a specified water source.
(Water management areas are more often than not synonymous with Water Catchment Areas.) Section 56 (2) states that the share component may be expressed as either:
• a specified maximum volume over a specified period;
• a specified proportion of the available water; 95 Water Management Act 2000 NSW s 3.
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• a specified proportion of the storage capacity of a specified dam or other storage work and a specified proportion of the inflow to that dam or work; or
• a specified number of units. (In practice this is the method that is used.)
The extraction component provides the holder with the right to take water at specified times, at specified rates or in specified circumstances (or any combination of these) and in specified areas or locations. 96 Hence it could, for example, specify the creek from which the water is to be taken and the months of the year when it may be taken. If an available water determination for that water source is announced by the Minister, the water allocation account for that licence will be credited with a volume of available water. 
Water Use and Water Supply Approvals
It should be noted that WALs do not permit their holders to use the water to which the holders have access, nor do WALs permit the construction of a water supply work. In order to use water in a particular way (eg for irrigation) one must apply for a Water Use Approval under s 89(1) of the WMA and in order to be able to pump water from where it is available a Water Use Approval must also be sought. Unlike WALs, Water Use Approvals are tied to the land. As a result they are not the subject of independent trade transactions. 108 Whether or not characterising WALs as property is actually desirable is an issue beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the argument against using the traditional common law property forms, because they may not be sufficiently capable of capturing the nuances of the rights or entitlements that water management in the twenty first century needs to rely on, has some merit. See Godden (2003) . In a sense an analogy can be drawn here with Native Title, in that traditional property law concepts appear inadequate to capture the diversity and range of traditional law concepts that are reflected in the 'recognition space' of native title. The discussion above has concentrated on WALs but trading is not limited to the WAL itself.
Water allocations, as distinct from the whole or part of a share component, may be traded.
Further entitlements under a WAL may be only temporarily traded. Such temporary trades are known as temporary transfers and they are akin to leases.\. Hence it is useful to consider the trading provisions in more detail.
What is the regime for transfer of WALs or parts thereof?
The trading In order to transfer a WAL or part thereof from vendor to purchaser there must be compliance with the provisions set out in the statute, as they pertain to trading and conveyancing.
Conclusions regarding WALs
It remains to be seen whether these approaches to water management will successfully promote the goals of water reform and offer a better alternative to water management than past policies and practices which gave the State the capacity to control and distribute water according to human and environmental need.
The impetus to promote water reform through market forces has, as noted above, gained momentum but perhaps some caution should be exercised before simply accepting this approach as the best on the basis that it is now operational and because it is popular.
The conclusion of this paper raises some basic questions about the premise that commodification is necessarily the best approach, as well as highlighting some issues surrounding the implementation of a commodification approach to water.
Questions regarding commodification as a technique of water management
As noted above, many stakeholders in the water debate favour the commodification of water as a technique of management. The Irrigators' Council, the Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists, the National Farmers' Federation and the Barton Group to name but a few, have embraced the establishment of a water market as a means by which water can, at least in part be managed. Although groups such as these were vocal about the mechanics of specific draft legislative provisions during the developmental and consultative stages preceding legislation implementation, the idea of a water market was taken up enthusiastically. However, evidence on the potential for the failure of water markets suggests that caution would be prudent.
109 Indeed in several international jurisdictions, including Argentina and Bolivia there has been dissatisfaction and discontent with the introduction of water markets. In Yogyakarta, Indonesia, a protest by the People's Water Concern Alliance on 4 June, 2005, saw hundreds of demonstrators including students, farmers and non government organisations demanding that water management be returned to its social function rather than letting it go down the path of a tradeable commodity.
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A number of issues concerning water trading in the NSW context deserve attention. Some of these are set out below.
i) Water barons
If water access licences, for example, are able to be bought and sold on a water market, it may be possible for some parties to accumulate large entitlements to water, creating what has become known, in common parlance, as 'water barons'. A market failure could lead to water barons potentially buying up several entitlements and creating a monopoly over water entitlements which would have an impact on price and perhaps service.
The premise underpinning water trading is that people will behave in an economically rational manner but this cannot be guaranteed. Further, what is economically rational in the short term may not be economically rational in the long term. problem is being dealt with differently. In New South Wales the view seems to be that the requiring of Ministerial consent for the trade of entitlements should be a sufficient mechanism to prevent the development of water barons. However, consent requirements are open to abuse and corruption at worse, and are the subject of intense lobbying at best. If the parties to a dispute over Ministerial consent do not have equal bargaining power it is possible that this control mechanism will not serve society well.
ii) Compensation
There is a strongly voiced view that if the new trading regime and, in particular, the new licensing system under the WMA causes some people to have to change their business activities because of reduced water allocations, for example, then those people should receive compensation. The issue is a difficult one. On one hand and through no fault of their own some people may be forced out of business by acts and policies of government. In order to maintain a stable economy and as a matter of social justice those people may need the support, offered through a compensation package so that they can retrain and re-build their lives and businesses.
Yet on the other hand, it may be argued that many people regularly face business closure without the cushion of compensation. Often business closure can be the result of policy modifications or changes in community attitude, yet no compensation flows. Take for example the butcher whose business fails as a consequence of a government supported National Heart Foundation policy which encourages people to eat less red meat.
Whether compensation should be offered is itself arguable in the context of the water debate. If it is to be made available, the next difficult question to arise is that of how the loss caused by the new water regime should be valued. For example, should compensation be paid for the actual loss of water use at the time the rights are affected or should it be valued on the basis of the economic potential of those rights?
iii) Infrastructure
In many cases an inherent part of the trading concept involves water being transported from point A to point B. So if, for example, M buys X's water access licence from him/her and acquires a share of the available water as well as a right to extract that share of water, M may well wish to
Transforming Cultures eJournal Vol. 1 No. 2 © 2006 Janice Gray use the water on his/her property; his/her property not being situated near the point at which M is able to access the water. Infrastructure is, therefore, needed to get M's water to the point where M needs it. If it is simply a case of M buying a water entitlement upstream from the land on which M wishes to use that entitlement, there will be far fewer difficulties than if M buys an entitlement for water that is to be used some distance away. In many cases hydraulic conveyances may be needed to transport water to M (water is heavy) but these are expensive to provide and need adequate funding. Without adequate funding for both the conveyance of water and the treatment of it, water trading will be severely impeded. Where that funding is to come from needs to be clearly established.
iv) Increased water costs will result in less use
Prof Peter Cullen, 111 among many others, believes that "a realistic price for water will determine how people use it." 112 The view that "the cost of water must reflect its scarcity" has become more audible. 113 In the rural sector the cost of access licences (and their component parts) will be determined by market forces but in urban areas water retailers (such as SydneyWater) will charge water end-users directly. The pricing structure used is determined by the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) which announced a new pricing scheme for water in the Sydney metropolitan area and its environs, in 2005. The scheme only covers SydneyWater supplied water and is based on a two-tiered, inclining block approach which is designed to target discretionary water users. 114 The actual price determinations announced by IPART involve increases in the cost of water in Sydney. Price control has, therefore, become a tool of water management. Whether there are sufficient inbuilt safeguards for the vulnerable members of society under such a scheme
is as yet unknown. Such a scheme would need to factor into pricing the social and financial inequalities that affect society if it is to serve the community well. 
Ranald points out that as a signatory to the General Agreement on Trade Services (GATS)
Australia is bound by changes to that agreement. 116 She raises some potential concerns about any changes to GATS; concerns which revolve around the right of governments to regulate services and to remove barriers to international trade in environmental services. She also highlights some of the issues associated with defining all water services as commercially traded goods rather than as public traded goods. Ranald suggests that if Australia agreed to such changes those changes would be legally binding and could result in the undermining of our present safeguards which ensure equitable access and the affordable pricing of water services. Accordingly, we would need to consider how we would respond to access and pricing procedures being challenged by a transnational corporation which took the view that those restrictions were barriers to free trade.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper offered a descriptive overview of the development of riverine water law in New South Wales, tracing its course from riparian rights through to commodification. The paper emphasised the different legal classifications of water entitlements and explained how and why these classifications were significant, particularly in the context of commodification.
Finally, it raised a number of issues about whether the fundamental concept of commodification was necessarily beneficial and it highlighted some of the difficulties in implementing a scheme of water use and management based on trading. In particular, it was concerned with whether or not social justice initiatives and objectives could be satisfied adequately under a scheme which relied on the market to re-allocate a rare and increasingly valuable resource. Given that (a) markets are sometimes volatile and/or unpredictable and (b) the commodity itself (water) is one about which science cannot predict or estimate future volume, it would seem sensible to take a cautious approach to the market's ability to manage water. Even if it were conceded that the market could contribute to better allocations of the resource, it is perhaps helpful to keep in mind that it would be just that: a contribution. It is unlikely that the introduction of a (partial) national water market will alone be the panacea to the water problem in Australia, particularly given that so little water in New South Wales would, in a practical, sense be tradeable.
